Trotskyism Is Not Leninism Pt. 1
Manolis Rodriguez, Giovanni Rios
“In a word, at this moment, all that Leninism consists of is based on lies and falsifications, and bears in itself the seeds of its own decay.”
Trotsky’s letter to Chkheidze, 1913
Introduction
Trotskyism is a revisionist distortion of Marxism that emerged from the theoretical works of Leon Trotsky. It opposes Lenin’s application of Marxism to the era of imperialism and the political line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attracting many dissidents who seek to maintain an air of “leftism” while remaining hostile toward the Soviet system. Trotskyism has been the starting point for all kinds of opportunist strains of Marxism over the years, and its ideological legacy is still alive and well today. It persists in several social-democratic, Trotskyist, and “Trotsky-ish” organizations in the US today, such as the Democratic Socialists of America, the Party for Socialism and Liberation, and the recently established Revolutionary Communists of America. It also has influences within many trade unions and organizations in the broader labor movement.
To combat this influence, we must develop our understanding of Trotskyism, its current and historical failures, and its inner workings, distinguishing it from genuine scientific communism. Only by understanding the ideological shortcomings of Trotskyism can we make a clean break with this pernicious and pervasive ideological confusion and develop a revolutionary strategy that can guide the construction of the communist party in this country. This task is also necessary to debunk the absurd claims arising from modern opportunist currents that paint the more principled revolutionary forces as “ultra-left,” “Trotskyist,” “Neo-Trots,” “Crypto-Trots,” and so on.
The Communist Workers’ Platform, as a Marxist-Leninist organization, aims to lead this ideological struggle and clarify that the authentically revolutionary position builds upon the works and teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. However, Trotskyists tend to justify their views by framing themselves as the true heirs to the ideology of Lenin while characterizing Marxist-Leninists as the distorters. Therefore, we must clarify that Trotskyism, far from following it, actually breaks with the ideology of Lenin, that is, with Marxism-Leninism. However, before doing that, we must review the many instances in which Trotsky demonstrated his opposition to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, in both words and actions, to establish a historical basis for our claim.
Historical Background
Leon Trotsky was born Lev Davidovich Bronstein in 1879 to a wealthy landowning family in present-day Ukraine. Joining the RSDLP in 1898, his political career would be characterized primarily by his repeated attempts to undermine and destroy the Bolsheviks while pretending to support them. Trotsky’s faction mainly supported the Mensheviks throughout the pre-revolutionary period, only joining the Bolshevik Party at the 6th Congress following the February Revolution. However, they continued to fight Lenin and his ideas throughout the revolutionary period and afterward, repeatedly breaching party discipline.
Trotsky and his supporters frequently distort historical facts to reduce the conflict between Bolshevism and Trotskyism to a personal confrontation between Lenin and Stalin, on the one hand, and Trotsky, on the other. This distortion became even more pronounced in the period following the October Revolution. As we will outline below, the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Trotskyists was based not on conflicting personalities but on contradictory political positions.
Pre-Revolutionary Period
From the beginning, Trotsky opposed Bolshevism and actively struggled against Lenin’s line within the RSDLP. In 1903, at the Second Congress of the RSDLP—the event where the split occurred, resulting in the Bolsheviks (majority) and Mensheviks (minority)—Trotsky was generally aligned with the Menshevik side. Contrary to claims that attempt to attribute to Trotsky a role as one of the organizers of the Bolshevik Party, he shared many views with the Mensheviks regarding the party’s organizational structure.
One of the central issues debated at the congress was the rules for membership in the RSDLP, which led to a confrontation between Martov and Lenin. Lenin’s proposal established three requirements for membership:
[1] Acceptance of the party program,
[2] Financial support of the party
[3] Membership and participation in a party organization
In contrast, Martov’s proposal required only the first two obligations for membership. By allowing individuals to join the party without joining a party organization, Martov would have opened the party to opportunists and unstable non-proletarian elements within the movement. Lenin’s rules, in line with the conception of the party as an organized detachment of the proletariat, aimed to create a monolithic, militant party with a concrete organization. Meanwhile, Martov’s rules, viewing the party as amorphous, sought to establish a loose, heterogeneous, and undisciplined party. Arguing in favor of his views, Martov stated, “We could only rejoice if every striker, every demonstrator, answering for his actions, could proclaim himself a Party member.” Lenin correctly criticized this position as reducing Marxism to mere strike-making. Far from failing to address manifestations of the class struggle within the proletariat, Marxists have the unquestionable duty to direct every such manifestation.
Trotsky wavered on this vital issue, first siding with Lenin and later attempting to defend Martov’s proposal. It would not be the last time Trotsky opposed Lenin. It is not for nothing that Lenin characterized him as follows:
“Trotsky was an ardent Iskrist in 1901–03, and Ryazanov described his role at the Congress of 1903 as “Lenin’s cudgel”. At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik, i.e., he deserted from the Iskrists to the Economists. He said that “between the old Iskra and the new lies a gulf”. In 1904–05, he deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, now co-operating with Martynov (the Economist), now proclaiming his absurdly Left “permanent revolution” theory. In 1906–07, he approached the Bolsheviks, and in the spring of 1907 he declared that he was in agreement with Rosa Luxemburg.
“In the period of disintegration, after long “non-factional” vacillation, he again went to the right, and in August 1912, he entered into a bloc with the liquidators. He has now deserted them again, although in substance he reiterates their shoddy ideas.”
V. I. Lenin, “Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity”, 1914
From 1910 to 1914, the RSDLP was not a unified party. It became divided into multiple factions, each centered around an independent branch and governing body. The principal groups were Lenin’s Bolsheviks and two Menshevik factions: the Trotskyists and the Otzovists. By 1912, Lenin and the Bolsheviks expelled the Mensheviks, who sought to transform the underground Russian Social Democratic Labor Party into a legal, reformist organization. This expulsion enabled Lenin to consolidate the party into a disciplined revolutionary force.
Following their expulsion, the Mensheviks, Trotskyists, and other anti-Bolshevik factions formed the “August Bloc.” Trotsky adopted a centrist position, claiming to seek unity between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, which Lenin perceived as a guise for the Menshevik agenda.
Lenin wrote, “Whoever supports Trotsky’s puny group supports a policy of lying and deceiving the workers, shielding the liquidators. Full freedom of action for Potresov and Co. in Russia, and the shielding of their deeds by ‘revolutionary’ phrase-mongering abroad — there you have the essence of ‘Trotskyism.’”
Lenin began calling Trotsky “Judas Trotsky” for pretending to support the Bolsheviks while aiding their opponents, a trend that continued throughout Trotsky’s life.
The Trotskyists claimed to act as conciliators between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, but in essence, they supported the positions of the Menshevik bandits.
October Revolution
The preparation for the October uprising highlights that Trotskyism is fundamentally incompatible with Leninism, contrary to claims that Lenin and Trotsky agreed. Attempts by Trotsky and the editor of his letters, “Lentsner,” to align Trotskyism with Leninism resemble modern efforts to pass off Trotskyism under the guise of Leninism.
Trotsky’s profound differences with Lenin and the rest of the party are evident in the following three periods of 1917 leading up to the October Revolution:
March – April
During this period, Trotsky sought to exaggerate disagreements within the party and even gloated over them. He portrayed these disagreements as a manifestation of two wings within Bolshevism—a characterization rejected by the majority of the party. Additionally, Trotsky accepted Lentsner’s claim that his Letters from America anticipated Lenin’s Letters from Afar, which formed the basis for Lenin’s April Theses. However, Trotsky’s letters were anti-Bolshevik, denying the participation of the peasantry in the revolution, and bore no relation to Lenin’s ideas. Upon returning from abroad, Lenin found it necessary to distance himself from Trotsky’s views.
May – August
Trotsky attempted to use party disagreements to invent a so-called “Left” and “Right” wing, ignoring that the party resolves natural differences of opinion through discussion and debate. He overlooked the unity of the Central Committee on issues such as the April demonstrations and the need to postpone the June 10 demonstrations. He falsely claimed that leading members of the Central Committee regarded the July armed demonstration as a “harmful adventure” and distorted history by suggesting there was a “Right” wing of the Central Committee. Trotsky used this fabrication to falsely accuse party leaders of inclining toward support for the Provisional Government despite the party’s unified stance during the Kornilov revolt. He misinterpreted Lenin’s letters, ignoring their intent to anticipate potential mistakes.
September – October
Trotsky mistakenly believed those advocating participation in the Pre-Parliament did so to direct the workers. He misrepresented Lenin’s views on the role of the Soviets in the uprising, falsely attributing to Lenin the faulty idea that the party should take power independently of and behind the backs of the Soviets. In reality, Lenin asserted that they must do so through the Soviets.
Trotsky also incorrectly assessed the timing and decisions of the Bolshevik Central Committee regarding the October 1917 uprising. He claimed that the Central Committee had set October 15 as the date only to postpone it until October 25. However, the Central Committee’s resolutions on October 10 and 16 focused on the necessity and preparation for the uprising without specifying a date. Trotsky was mistaken in suggesting that Lenin underestimated the importance of Soviet legality and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets taking power on October 25. Lenin advocated taking power before October 25 for two reasons: the threat of counter-revolutionaries surrendering Petrograd and the need to act before the enemy could prepare for the announced date of the uprising. Lenin’s emphasis on timing was vindicated when the Petrograd Soviet and the Revolutionary Military Committee took power before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened on October 25.
Contrary to the claims of Trotsky’s supporters, Trotsky did not play a leading role in the October uprising despite being a member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and chairing the Petrograd Soviet. His role was significant only in that he carried out the directives of the party’s higher bodies, which oversaw every step he took. The organizational leadership elected to direct the uprising included Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov, and Uritsky, but not Trotsky. Why would Trotsky have a leading role when he was new to the party and had an anti-party past? Why would he have played a leading role when, during periods of retreat in the face of German imperialism, he aligned himself with the panic-stricken and despairing Socialist Revolutionaries? The most ardent and trusted fighters who carried out Lenin’s directives during the uprising were the ones who displayed the same vigor during the revolution’s most challenging periods.
That is why the Central Committee did not assign Trotsky a leading role during the October Uprising. It is also why the Central Committee ensured that military experts, rather than Trotsky, defined the strategy during the Civil War—a wise decision, as Trotsky never intended to turn a new leaf and become an honest Bolshevik.
Post-October
1918
Following the October Revolution, one of the first actions of the young Soviet State was to extricate itself from the First World War, which remained an imperialist conflict. This move was essential for its survival. The party needed breathing room in its foreign policy to revitalize the economy and build its defensive capabilities. Lenin believed peace had to be established through negotiations with Germany, leading to the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. They took this step based on the objective conditions at the time despite facing intense opposition from petty-bourgeois elements within the party. During the negotiations, Lenin outlined the fundamental principles of proletarian internationalism, emphasizing the readiness of the working class in power to make sacrifices for the greater good of the international proletariat. Lenin viewed the treaty as a necessary concession to imperialism, acknowledging that a temporary retreat was required to consolidate workers’ power and prepare for future struggles. This retreat was necessary because revolutions had not matured simultaneously in all countries.
In December 1917, Germany gave an ultimatum to the Soviet Republic regarding peace terms. Trotsky was assigned to negotiate the peace agreement at Brest-Litovsk. As head of the delegation, Trotsky initially agreed with Lenin to hold out until the Germans issued an ultimatum. However, Trotsky reversed this understanding, refusing to sign the treaty, declaring the state of war over, and simultaneously ordering the demobilization of the Soviet army. These decisions played into the hands of the German delegates, allowing Kaiser Wilhelm’s government to shift the blame for the breakdown of peace talks onto the Soviet Republic. Trotsky’s actions ultimately aided the most aggressive circles of imperialism in achieving their aims.
Following this declaration, peace talks broke down, and on February 16, Germany announced it would resume military operations on February 18. The Central Committee of the party held two separate votes after the German Command’s announcement. Trotsky, Bukharin, and other opposition members were able to reject Lenin’s proposal to invite the Germans back to the negotiating table, arguing that a supposed German revolution would stop the advance of German troops. Lenin sharply criticized this view, warning that failure to conclude a peace treaty would lead to the resumption of German military operations. Lenin was proven right when, on February 18, German troops launched an all-out offensive with orders to capture Kyiv, Moscow, and Petrograd. The young Soviet Republic faced a critical situation, demonstrating its inability to fight a war.
Despite the danger, Trotskyites were willing to gamble with the existence of Soviet power, insisting on continuing the war. During a Central Committee meeting on February 18, Lenin led a fierce struggle against the adventurist positions of Trotsky and Bukharin, ultimately securing a vote to ask the German government to conclude a peace treaty immediately. Under Lenin’s guidance, they also implemented measures to organize and strengthen the Red Army and the country’s defense capacity. Despite sending a peace proposal to the German government, the Germans continued their offensive, responding to the Soviet note on February 23 by demanding more humiliating peace terms and requiring them to accept within 48 hours. Trotsky and Bukharin continued to attack Lenin’s position, arguing that signing the treaty would violate internationalism and alienate the advanced sections of the proletariat. Lenin, however, demonstrated that refusing to conclude peace would doom the existence of the socialist state. He declared that if the war continued, he would withdraw from the Central Committee and the Soviet government. Lenin’s proposal for peace narrowly won in a vote of seven to four, and on March 3, a new delegation, excluding Trotsky, signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Trotsky and his followers did not stop there. At the Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RSDLP(b), they once again opposed Lenin on the issues of war, peace, and revolution. Trotsky defended his theory of permanent revolution, arguing that they could not build socialism in one country and that signing the treaty was an intolerable compromise with the bourgeoisie. He falsely claimed that the desire to reject the treaty reflected the will of the entire party. Lenin responded by exposing the grave errors of the “Left opportunists,” offering a scientific analysis of the socialist revolution’s development in Russia, the international situation, capitalist encirclement, and the need for policies that would allow the construction of socialism while preventing the capitalist countries from uniting against the Soviet Republic. Supporting Lenin’s position were Sverdlov, Artyom, Shelavin, and the Petrograd workers’ delegates. At the Seventh Congress, Trotsky and the Left Communists were condemned by Sverdlov, exposing them as splitters whose positions aligned with those of the Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Cadets. Rozanova, a delegate from the Yaroslavl city organization, highlighted this connection by pointing to the Cadets’ activities in Yaroslavl, where they called for peasants to reject peace with Germany and prepare for war—essentially the same “revolutionary war” advocated by Trotsky, Bukharin, and their followers. Despite a vote of 30 to 12 in favor of Lenin’s position “On War and Peace” to ratify the peace treaty, Trotsky and his followers continued behaving disruptively.
Shortly after adopting Lenin’s policy, Trotsky announced his resignation from all his posts. His followers, Krestinsky and Joffe, subsequently tabled a motion endorsing the tactics adopted at the Seventh Congress for the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk, which led to the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets from March 14 to 16, 1918. A total of 1,172 delegates attended this Congress, including 814 Bolsheviks, 225 Left SRs, 15 Right SRs, 14 anarchists, 16 internationalist Mensheviks, 3 Ukrainian Mensheviks, and 18 non-party delegates. The composition of the Congress gave rise to a sharp struggle. The petty-bourgeois and anti-Bolshevik groups resorted to slander and insinuations to prevent the treaty’s ratification. Bolsheviks like Sverdlov, Chicherin, Sergeyev, and Volodarsky rebuffed the demagogic activities of the non-Bolshevik groups, exposing their positions as unfounded and aiding counter-revolutionary forces. In a roll call vote, the Congress adopted Lenin’s resolution with 784 votes in favor, 261 against, and 115 abstentions, including 55 supporters of Bukharin and Trotsky. These results once again highlighted the anti-Leninist positions of Trotsky and his followers. Meeting on March 15, 1918, the Central Committee passed a resolution binding all party members to vote for the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. Predictably, Trotsky and Bukharin failed to abide by this decision.
1920 – 1921
The Trade Union Question
During this period, the Soviet Republic transitioned from war to socialist construction. However, the party faced the challenge of waging an intense struggle against the Trotskyites, Workers’ Opposition, Democratic Centralists, and other opportunist groups, all ideologically inspired by Trotsky. A significant issue was the role of trade unions in the dictatorship of the proletariat, a debate forced upon the party by Trotsky on the eve of the Tenth Congress. The context of this debate is crucial: the country was devastated by imperialist and Civil Wars, with industrial output severely reduced and agricultural production down twenty-fivefold. This predominance of agriculture reflected pressures from petty-bourgeois elements. There were signs of wavering among these groups due to substantial changes in the party’s composition and increasing membership. Many new members lacked experience in the revolutionary struggle against tsarism and the bourgeoisie. Peasants, office workers, and other social groups outnumbered workers in the party. Additionally, after the October Revolution, former Mensheviks, SRs, Borotbists, Bundists, Maximalists, and members of non-proletarian parties joined the Communist Party, creating fertile ground for opportunist ideas and anti-party activities. As the class struggle intensified, Trotskyites came to embrace these ideas.
The party needed to rehabilitate industry and agriculture, recover from two wars, establish a connection between the working class and the peasantry, and lay the foundations for a future socialist society. In these challenging conditions, the Trotskyites and other groups insisted that the party focus on trade unions as its central task. They argued that the trade unions were in crisis, nearing collapse because their role in production was unclear. The Central Committee opposed Trotsky’s position, arguing that he was ignoring the broader political situation. Lenin emphasized that the trade unions were a vital link between the party and the working class, and it was a mistake to address them separately from the party’s position and Soviet power. Unlike Trotsky’s view, the critical issue for the party and the Soviet state was the relationship between the working class and the peasantry—the relationship between town and country. Trotsky’s position was anti-Marxist, attempting to distract the party from economic construction and the correct relationship between the vanguard and the masses (the majority of society). Lenin warned that this debate posed a political danger due to domestic and international difficulties. The role of the trade unions within the system of the proletarian dictatorship had already been defined in the RCP(B) program by its Eighth Congress in 1919 and reaffirmed in the Ninth Congress in early 1920 (see “On the Question of the Trade Unions and Their Organisations”). The All-Russia Congresses and the Fifth All-Russia Conference had also outlined the tasks of the trade unions in economic construction. Lenin’s participation in the Second and Third All-Russia Trade Union Congresses shaped the resolutions produced. A draft written by Lenin also formed the basis of a decision adopted by the RCP(B) group at the Fifth All-Russia Trade Union Congress in November 1920. Thus, the Trotskyite claims that the party avoided the trade union issue were merely a ploy to mislead the masses. From the beginning, the attempt to insert this question into the discussion was factional and unprincipled.
Trotsky also disregarded the party’s shift from wartime methods to strictly democratic practices, advocating for coercive measures and the militarization of trade unions. He justified his stance by pointing to the Central Committee of the Railwaymen’s and Water Transport Workers’ Union (Tsektran), which had implemented his methods. The Tsektran leadership widely used disciplinary punishment and fines, violating democratic principles and the autonomy of local trade unions. This approach led to resentment among the rank-and-file, and conflict brewed between Trotsky’s followers and those who opposed his anti-democratic methods. Despite this, Trotsky sought to impose this policy on the entire trade union movement. The party’s Central Committee rejected Trotsky’s proposals at its 1920 Plenary Meeting, deciding instead to appoint a commission of CC members and leading trade unionists to address the issues in the trade union movement. Although they appointed Trotsky to this commission, he refused to work on it, openly defying party discipline. Meanwhile, the Trotskyites continued their “shake-up” policies within Tsektran, causing a significant split in the union, the largest in the country at the time. Lenin warned that the entire trade union movement would fracture if other unions adopted these leadership methods.
Trotsky formalized his views in “The Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions,” which laid out his platform. Despite claiming it was a collective effort, Trotsky produced the pamphlet with a group outside the Central Committee and urged the forthcoming Tenth Congress to choose between the existing policies or Trotskyism. Under the guise of “enhancing” the role of trade unions in production, Trotsky proposed concentrating all management of production in the hands of the trade unions, transforming them into agencies of the socialist state, and gradually merging them with economic organs. He and his supporters argued that the parallel existence of trade unions and economic organs was intolerable and called for an urgent reorganization of trade union leadership. However, this was merely a pretext to remove Lenin’s supporters and secure an organizational foothold in trade union leadership. Implementing Trotsky’s policies would have destroyed trade unions as social, non-party organizations, converting them into a bureaucratic adjunct of the state apparatus. As a result, trade unions would cease to be bodies that mobilized millions of workers to participate in running society and served as a transmission belt from the vanguard to the masses. Trotsky’s view, once again, revealed itself to be anti-Leninist: he equated trade unions with the proletariat itself.
Trotsky’s factional struggle against Lenin and the party spurred other anti-party groups into action. During the trade union debates, seven anti-Leninist platforms on the unions emerged, most notably those of the Trotskyites and their supporters, the Workers’ Opposition. Other groups included the Democratic Centralists, the Ignatovites, the Ryazanovs, the Nogins, and others. Throughout this struggle, these groups formed alliances; for example, the Ignatovites joined forces with the Workers’ Opposition, which then united with the Trotskyites. All these platforms denied the party’s leading role and sought to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Workers’ Opposition, in particular, attempted to “trade-unionize the state,” advocating for the unions to take over the management of the country’s economy. They argued that the unions, rather than the party and state, truly represented the working class, thus abandoning the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle and erasing the distinction between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. While claiming to represent workers’ interests, they contended that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry surrendered the proletariat’s leading role to the petty bourgeoisie. In reality, they reflected the most backward attitudes of the petty bourgeoisie, embodying an anarcho-syndicalist deviation.
The struggle against the Workers’ Opposition and the “Democratic Centralism” group—a faction that represented the worst aspects of Menshevism and the ideas of the Socialist Revolutionaries—gave rise to what became known as the Platform of Ten. This platform was rooted in the party’s decisions regarding the role of trade unions under the dictatorship of the proletariat, viewing them as schools of political education and organizational skills. The main methods employed by the trade unions during this period were persuasion and workers’ democracy. The Platform of Ten played a significant role in defeating the anti-party forces.
On January 12, 1921, the Central Committee reaffirmed its decision that all organizations were free to discuss policies and adopted a resolution allowing delegates from various platforms to attend the party’s Tenth Congress. Every trend within the party was allowed to present its position. However, the opposition was condemned for its factional efforts, exaggerating the differences within the party and distracting from the urgent tasks of the time. Trotsky and his followers, of course, voted against this decision, as it dealt a heavy blow to Trotsky’s attempt to gather an anti-party bloc, aligning all opposition groups with him. At the same Congress, Trotsky attempted to blame the Central Committee for the existing food shortages, an accusation that Lenin condemned as demagoguery similar to that of the Makhno anarchists and Kronstadt elements. Such claims provided counter-revolutionaries and imperialist forces with an ideological weapon against the party and the Soviet state, completely ignoring the conditions of the time. Throughout the discussion, the Trotskyites distorted historical truth, attempting to portray Lenin as a centrist, essentially indistinguishable from Trotsky—a tactic still used by various Trotskyist currents today. Lenin outlined the struggle against these positions in his works: “The Trade Unions”, “The Present Situation and Trotsky’s Mistakes”, “The Party Crisis”, “Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Lenin.” These works played a crucial role in the ideological and organizational defeat of the oppositionists.
The New Economic Policy
During this period, the Trotskyites also opposed Lenin on several issues, including the plan for the electrification of the entire country, the adoption of a single long-range economic plan, the role of the peasantry and its alliance with the working class, and, notably, the New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP, which replaced War Communism following the Civil War’s end in 1921, was designed to restore industry from the ravages of war, gradually transform the country’s multi-structural economy into a socialist one, and guide small peasant farms toward social production. The substitution of tax-in-kind for the appropriation of surplus marked the beginning of the NEP, initiating trade between town and country and normalizing economic ties between socialized industry and agriculture. Peasants were allowed to sell their surplus agricultural production on the market. Trade developed, and several enterprises were leased to capitalists for use, though without ownership rights.
The party was aware that these measures constituted temporary concessions to capitalism. However, the NEP enabled the discovery of forms of cooperation between the working class and the peasantry, which ultimately enabled the socialist state to exert control over the petty-commodity peasant economy and draw the masses of peasants into socialist construction. However, opposition groups resisted the NEP, with the Trotskyites claiming it was not only a retreat but a gradual return to capitalism, a betrayal of socialism, and a disruption of the proletarian state. The SR and Menshevik press further propagated this view abroad. At the Tenth Congress, Trotsky attempted to counter the NEP with War Communism methods and increased pressure on the peasantry, even as the peasantry was spontaneously rising against War Communism. Such a proposal demonstrated the Trotskyites’ hostility to the peasantry and their belief that the peasants could not participate in socialist construction. They portrayed the peasantry as a solid reactionary mass, incapable of understanding the Marxist theory of class stratification and differentiation necessary for formulating correct alliance policies.
In this issue, Trotsky and his followers resembled opportunists like Kautsky and Otto Bauer. Trotsky proposed organizing peasants into labor units that would operate like military units under proletarian control, a grave threat to the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. The party rejected this militarization scheme in favor of Lenin’s policy of strengthening the worker-peasant alliance. Trotsky also emphasized the army’s role, proposing that they appoint soldiers to leading positions in production. In essence, Trotsky and his followers believed that militarized labor, through labor armies and forced labor, was the appropriate form of labor under socialism. On production, Lenin criticized Trotsky for separating consumption from production and confusing basic Marxist principles. Ultimately, the party exposed the Trotskyites’ flawed approach to socialist construction, their refusal to reckon with the objective laws of socialist development, their attempts to manage the economy through coercion, and their consistent vacillation between extreme positions.
Conclusion
This article is the first in a series exposing modern and historical Trotskyism as a distortion of Marxism-Leninism. In this part, we explored some of the historical differences between Lenin and Trotsky to establish that Trotsky never followed Leninism. Numerous examples demonstrate that Trotsky consistently opposed Lenin on fundamental issues, openly opposing Lenin and the party’s leading role at every critical juncture. This confrontation continued even after Lenin’s death in 1924, with Trotsky’s splitting activities persisting during Stalin’s leadership until Trotsky’s death in 1940, facilitated by the communists in Mexico. In upcoming articles, we will explore Trotskyism’s ideological principles and petty-bourgeois nature, further distinguishing Trotsky from Lenin and creating a framework for assessing modern variations of Trotskyism. This series will not extensively cover the conflict between Trotsky and Stalin, as historical and contemporary Trotskyist movements openly acknowledge and have extensively documented their differences.